364-0559-02L  Design of Institutions and Political Economy

Semester Spring Semester 2016
Lecturers O. Tejada Pinyol, H. Gersbach
Periodicity semester course
Language of instruction English

Abstract Institutions and in particular political institutions are a central determinant of economic performance. In this course, we learn the characteristics of collective decision making and political processes as well as the theoretical tools in institutional design. At the end of the course we will discuss recent research in political economics.Design of Institutions and Policy
Objective In this doctoral course, we learn the theoretical tools and major results in collective decision theory and political economics. We will use this knowledge to discuss recent research in political economics. The course enables the participants to do their own research in political economics or apply the frameworks to interesting institutional design problems in their own research area.
Content Part I: Theoretical Tools and Important Results (lectures)
1. Collective Decision Making and Impossibility Results
2. Voting Models
3. Lobbying
4. Creating Institutions: A Mechanism Design Perspective
5. Dynamic Political Economy

Part II: Recent Research in Political Economics (presentations)
Prerequisites / Notice In the first part, the theory is presented in lectures. In the second part, each participant will present a paper of her/his interest from the syllabus (provided in the first class meeting) and has to write a referee report (of max. 3 pages) on it.